In order to operate in the national airspace, a system must have documentation and analysis to show that it can operate at a satisfactory level of safety. For traditional manned systems, this is equivalent to operating a reliable system. However with Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), a relatively unreliable system can safely be operated provided that the risk to bystanders on the ground is sufficiently low. This paper presents a set of design tools and methodologies which can be used to assess the risk associated with operating an UAS in a potentially populated area. The intended use of the tool is discussed and a risk assessment is provided for an existing UAS.
Nomenclature

I. Introduction
In the future, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) will interact with general aviation and commercial flights in many different ways. They will bring with them new technologies and new possibilities in terms of missions that could be achieved. UAS will have to respect restrictions and constraints imposed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in order to achieve an acceptable level of safety and security. Usage of UAS by military organizations around the world has increased dramatically in the last several years. However, growth of UAS in the civilian and commercial market has been markedly slower. This is especially true in the U.S. where concerns over safe integration and operation of UAS in the national airspace system (NAS) have restricted the accessibility of this market. One of the main restrictions is the ambiguous and non-standardized set of design tools and methodologies which are currently employed by various UAS manufacturers in order to assess risk of a mission. This paper documents the development of a simplified model to assess and predict risk associated with a given UAS operation. This tool is intended to be useful for determining UAS scenarios that can operate at an acceptable level of safety from the perspective of risk to human safety.
Several efforts have been made in the past to assess the risk of a UAS mission. One of the first efforts involved modeling mid-air collisions using random collision theory and comparing results to historical data by Anno.
1 Similar work was performed by McGeer 2 with extensions involving regulatory policy and economics of these systems.
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More recently, focus has shifted towards integrating UAS into the NAS. 4 A similar risk-based approach to analyzing the safety of UAS operations was taken by Burke 5 at North Carolina State University in the development of the System Level Airworthiness Tool (SLAT). The author also chose to focus on the expected number of fatalities per flight hour as the primary safety metric. A similar approach was taken by Waggoner 6 and Lum 7 when developing a design tool to allow the risk associated with a given UAS mission to be calculated.
The current work focuses on building from many of these previously stated ideas in order to develop a methodology which can be used by UAS manufacturers when evaluating the risk of testing their systems in potentially populated areas. The example used in this paper focuses on performing a risk assessment required to obtain an Experimental Type Certificate for the Flexrotor aircraft 8 to perform flight tests at Husum, WA. The main metric for safety is potential harm to bystanders on the ground. Previous results
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have shown that the vast majority of failures of UAS are due to general system failures rather than mid-air collisions. Therefore, the primary concern is that when a UA fails, it will strike someone on the ground and cause harm.
Additional references and prior work are presented in the context of the federal UAS policy in Section II. This section serves as motivation by looking at current US policy relevant to UAS operations. Section III then describes some of the framework used to develop the overall risk model. Results and example calculations of this scenario are presented as well. Finally, Section IV presents conclusions and future directions of research.
II. Current UAS Policy
Without a thorough understanding of the risks involved, regulations on the flight of UAS in US airspace have thus far been highly prohibitive. Policy was set forth in a September, 2005 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) memorandum, 9 clarified in a 2006 notice, 10 and replaced in March 2008 by the Interim Operational Approval Guidance.
11 Currently, the only avenue to receive approval of civil (i.e. commercial, academia) UAS operation is through a special experimental airworthiness certificate. The special certificate is subject to operational limitations (e.g. line of sight operation, daylight hours, etc.) and is only issued "for the purposes of research and development, crew training, or market survey." The procedure and guidelines for issuing a special experimental certificate are detailed by the FAA.
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A second avenue, a certificate of authorization (COA), was closed to civil applications in 2005 by FAA memorandum AFS-400 9 but is still used for public (i.e. government/military) requests after the vehicle has been deemed airworthy by the FAA or DoD. A category that a minority of UAS may fall under is model aircraft 13 (strictly non-business related). Other documents of interests include NATO's UAV Systems Airworthiness Requirements 14 and the European Aviation Safety Agency's (EASA) statement on Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
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UAS policy is currently being reviewed to develop a long-term approach to a fluid integration of UAS into the NAS. Several components of the NextGen Air Transportation System (ATS) should help facilitate this process in the coming years.
16 NextGen refers to the next generation of the NAS being incrementally implemented over the course of several years, with current mid-term goals set through 2018. Two key NextGen technologies that have the greatest potential to impact UAS integration are Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and 4D Trajectory Based Operations (TBO). 
A. Motivation
It is generally perceived that there are a number of obstacles to the full integration of UAS into the NAS. The most pressing technological challenges are "sense and avoid" (SAA) capability and command and control (C2) link liabilities. 4 Sense and avoid refers to the capability of an autonomous vehicle to detect objects, both stationary and mobile, that do not broadcast their position, which are in the vehicle's path (or otherwise on a collision course) and, if necessary, alter the vehicle's course to avoid a collision. Since the pilot of a UAS is not able to provide the "see and avoid" ability of an onboard pilot, the development of reliable SAA technology is believed to be essential for UAS to gain full airspace access. Significant work has been done both in R&D of SAA technologies and in establishing qualifications for an acceptable SAA system.
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Although most UA a will have low-level autonomy, a reliable communication link between the UA and the pilot is necessary for high-level control (navigation, tasking, air traffic control, etc.). In addition to improving the C2 link reliability, protocols must be developed to ensure safe and predictable behavior in the case of a lost-link. There is also much work to be done on the policy front. Guidelines are needed on airworthiness, crew training, operational protocols and how UAS will fit into the current and NextGen airspace structures.
Thoroughly addressing all of these issues, so that UAS may be routinely and safely incorporated throughout the NAS, will take years. In the mean time, standards and tools need to be developed that will, "enable the widest range of activity that can be safely conducted within the shortest rulemaking timeframe" (ASTM F38 Committee). Until new technologies are developed and a new system is in place, UAS operation approvals will continue to require mission specific risk assessments.
The purpose of the risk assessment tool presented in this paper is two-fold. First, it seeks to provide UAS operators and airspace regulators with a simplified and trustworthy method of evaluating the safety of proposed UAS operations. Tools are needed that provide UAS operators with "documentation that support the 'extremely improbable' determination," since it is an essential part of the current approval process. The availability of a tool to assess the risk of particular proposed UAS operation should make the process of obtaining approval more efficient and manageable.
The second objective is that the results of risk assessments performed using this tool would supply useful information to the aerospace community as future standards and guidelines are being developed. Successful regulation will prohibit unsafe operations while clearing the way for operations that do not pose a threat to public safety. Tools such as this risk assessment procedure will help determine what type of operations pose significant risk and which do not so that the policies being developed can reflect the risk associated with various UAS applications in order to maintain a high level of safety.
III. Design Tools and Methodology for Assessing Risk
The example aircraft used in this analysis is the Flexrotor manufactured by the Aerovel Corporation shown below in Figure 1 .
The goal of this work is to assess the relative level of risk associated with operating this aircraft in the Husum, WA area. This same methodology can be applied to other types of UAS in potentially populated areas.
A. Experimental Type Certificate for Flexrotor
The first step to providing evidence to support the previously mentioned 'extremely improbable' determination is to understand and model how system failures ultimately correlate to human injuries and fatalities.
a UA is used to refer only to the aircraft, whereas UAS refers to the whole system inclusive of all ground-based equipment and any communication links. Aerovel is in the process of performing the necessary analysis to obtain an experimental type certificate for flying aircraft in the national airspace. Being able to test the aircraft near the manufacturing facility has the potential to save on travel expenses and lost opportunity while waiting for access to restricted airspace such as the Boardman, OR test range. This analysis could serve as a model for acceptance of risk analysis by the FAA.
Risk analysis for Flexrotor involves introducing, in simulation, a catastrophic control failure at random during flight over the Elsner airfield in Husum, WA. The failure is then simulated to the point of impact. Thousands of such runs are easily done, and allows an estimate of the probability distributions for impact around the test site. Meanwhile, census data and satellite imagery is used to estimate the local bystander distribution. The estimated failure rate of the system is taken from experimental results and hardwarein-the-loop simulation. The upper bound on risk of harm to nonparticipants on the ground can then be calculated as shown in Figure 2 . 
B. Failure Simulation
A major component of the risk assessment involves analyzing a large amount of failures of the aircraft and simulating impact zones and areas from these failures. A representative flight of the aircraft is first simulated and then state information is logged for this flight. The representative flight timeline is described in Table 1 . A failure is then injected to the flight at random times. The failure times are uniformly sampled from the representative flight. In order to simulate a flight computer failure, the control surfaces are frozen at their current state and the engine is shut down. A sampling of approximately 15,000 initial failure points are shown in Figure 3(a) . From this point, a failure is simulated by freezing the control surface and simulating the dynamics of the powerless aircraft forward in time using a high fidelity, proprietary numerical simulator until the aircraft reaches a preset altitude of 178m (altitude of terrain near Husum, WA). Results of these forward simulations are shown in Figure 3(b) .
As can be seen, the vast majority of crashes occur very close to the initial failure location. This implies that once the aircraft experiences a failure, the system rapidly descends and crashes.
Because the failures are introduced at various altitudes, one useful metric would be the average glide angle between the initial failure point and the crash location. Geometry of the situation is shown in Figure 4 .
From the geometry, we see that the average glide angle is simply given by
A histogram of the average glide angle is shown in Figure 5 (a). As can be seen from this histogram, the majority of glide angles are near 90 degrees, implying that most of the crashes occur near the location of the initial failure. The benefit of analyzing the glide angle is that it allows the radial distance traveled before crashing to be normalized by the altitude. For example, if a mission has the aircraft operating at an average altitude of h, for a given glide angle, the radial distance between failure and crash can be computed using Eq. 1 to obtain
Eq. 2 can then be applied to the distribution shown in Figure 5 (a) to obtain the distribution of horizontal distance between failure and crash for a nominal operation altitude of 500m. This histogram is shown in Figure 5 (b). 
The approximate values of the polynomial constants are shown in Table 3 . 
is not a probability density function (PDF). However, it can be converted to a PDF by normalizing it so that the area under the curve is one. Therefore, for a given failure, the PDF describing the horizontal distance traveled before impact likelihood in the range of
where γ = ∫ dmax 0 f (τ )dτ . Therefore, the total PDF for an entire range of distances is given as
Eq. 5 can then be used to create a radial probability density function to visualize crash potential over a 2 dimensional space as shown in Figure 6 (a). This crash density representation can be overlaid with a satellite image of the test area to determine actual risk to human and structures as shown in Figure 6(b) . (a) Radial crash probability density function vs. radial distance from failure location.
(b) Radial crash probability overlaid with satellite image of test area near Husum, WA Figure 6 . Radial crash probability function and surrounding structures.
Figure 6(b) shows that 99% of all failures will fall within the circular regions. More specifically, 99% of all impacts will fall within the circular region for a failure at the center of the circle. These regions are mostly unpopulated and therefore, there is a negligible risk to humans or structures. The one exception is the structure in the northwest region of the test area which actually falls within a relatively high probability strike area.
The population and structural densities are extracted from census data and then analyzed. These structural and population densities can be combined with the crash probability shown previously. The population density of the surrounding ares is shown in Figure 7 .
As can be seen, the only area of any calculable risk is in the southwest area of the airfield. This is the only section where a non-trivial population density intersects the finite crash probability distribution. Note that at this point, the crash probability is sufficiently low so the product of crash probability and population density is acceptably low. It is also worth noting that moving the flight test area 200m to the northwest would yield no intersections with the downtown Husum area population. Also note that by operating at lower altitudes, the radius of significant crash probability could also be lowered so that the crash areas do not intersect areas of significant population.
The two areas of intersection are designed as 1 (area of relatively high population to the southwest) and 2 (area of low population elsewhere). Give a UAS failure, the percentage of crashes which occur in either area are given by
Based on the probability density function, we see that approximately 1% of UAS failures will occurs in area 1 (highly populated) whereas the vast majority will occur in area 2 (low population density).
If a failure occurs, the UAS will glide and potentially strike pedestrians on the ground. The lethal areas where pedestrians may be struck is illustrated in Figure 8 .
The potentially lethal area is given as
Some other relevant parameters used to estimate the human collisions/hr are shown in Table 3 . With these parameters, the expected number of pedestrian collisions per flight hour is given by
Using the values for this scenario, a collision rate of F f at,p = 1.27 × 10 − 5 pedestrian collisions per flight hour is calculated. This translates into roughly one collision every 80,000 hours of operation. Therefore, this operation in this area can be considered extremely safe (even with a somewhat conservative estimate of 0.1 failures per flight hour). 
IV. Conclusions and Further Research
The methodologies outlined in this paper can be used to assess the risk of a UAS operating in a populated area. It allows the user to calculate the estimated number of bystander collisions per flight hour based on readily available data such as satellite imagery and census information. UAS failure rates can be determined from manufacturer specifications and experimentally obtained data such as hardware-in-the-loop simulation.
The tool is currently being used to develop safety cases which will be both illustrative and directly applicable to current issues. This analysis will be used for Aerovel's application to the FAA to obtain an experimental type certification for operations in the Husum, WA area. This work is also in the process of being applied to a case study to allow UAS to operate in the Juniper military operation area (MOA).
Current research is directed towards combining this methodology with existing tools 7 to assess the risk at different phases of the flight such as prolonged cruise. In addition, factors such as birdstrike and midair collisions are being added to the model. Various improvements to the current algorithm are also being investigated. These include concepts such as fitting a simpler function to the experimental distributions. For example, fitting a 2D Gaussian to the crash PDF will serve to simply the calculations and allow for analytical calculation of some parameters. Although this may not fit the actual distribution as accurately, it has been observed that a higher fidelity model does not increase accuracy beyond already existing uncertainty bounds.
Another area of improvement is the convolution of the crash PDF with the population density. An improved method would involve creating software to automatically calculate the population density of each pixel of the satellite image similar to that shown in Figure 9 . This information can then be combined with the spatially oriented crash PDF in order to calculate a more accurate estimate of bystander collisions. The probability density function in terms of both glide angle and crash distance are likely highly dependent on mode of operation. For example, thrust-borne maneuvers are likely to be highly unstable and once the in-flight computer fails, the aircraft crashes almost immediately. Conversely, in a stable wing-borne flight, the aircraft has the potential to glide for a considerable distance before crashing. Therefore, individual PDFs based on operating mode may improve accuracy of estimation by a significant margin.
Incorporating these elements will serve to ameliorate concerns about manned and unmanned aircraft coexisting in shared airspace.
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